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INTRODUCTION
The aim of this chapter is to provide a critical analysis of the curriculum of Islamic
education. The question to be addressed in this chapter is whether the current
curriculum of Islamic education is able to realise the true purpose of Islamic
education. In seeking the answer to this question, the chapter focuses on various
views of curriculum and the different concepts of education they incorporate. To
this end, the first section provides a conceptual framework for critically examining
the curriculum, which draws on Habermas’ Theory of Knowledge-Constitutive
Interests (KCI), and in particular, the way this is employed by Grundy (1987) to
examine different kinds of curriculum policy, practice, and pedagogy. In the second
section, the curriculum of Islamic education is analysed so as to identify its
curriculum and the view of education it sustains. The next section suggests Kazmi’s
(2003) personalised knowledge as an alternative view of Islamic education and
how this view is able to realise the true purpose of Islamic education.
A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK FOR THE ANALYSIS OF
CURRICULUM AND PEDAGOGY: IDEALS, REALITIES,
AND IDEOLOGIES
Defining the ‘Curriculum’
The way curriculum is understood and theorised has changed over the years, which
has inevitably led to considerable disputation regarding its meaning. A general
definition of curriculum is succinctly described by Kerr as ‘all the learning which
is planned and guided by the school, whether carried on in groups or individually,
inside or outside the school’ (cited in Kelly, 1999, p. 6). This definition treats
curriculum as a programme of activities which teachers may not be involved in
planning, but are responsible for what students learn. It also includes the formal
and informal curriculum where the former concerns learning activities that take
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place during the school timetable whilst the latter involves activities that go on
outside of school hours such as extracurricular activities.
However, this definition does not capture the ‘unintended’ learning that
students acquire through the ‘hidden curriculum.’ The ‘hidden curriculum’ implies
that sometimes students learn things which are not intended by teachers. In a sense,
what is taught may not necessarily match what students learn. There is a distinction
between the ‘planned’ and the ‘received’ curriculum. Any of these definitions of
curriculum should consider more than just the content of what is to be taught.
More importantly, the developers of a curriculum need to consider the purpose
and effects of such knowledge on its recipients. The relationship between intention
and reality of curriculum should be examined if curriculum theory and practice are
to be linked.
It would be clearer and more meaningful if curriculum was defined and
understood in relation to society. This could be achieved with the help of Habermas’
Theory of Knowledge-Constitutive Interests (KCI) of how fundamental human
interests influence how knowledge is ‘constituted’ or constructed, which is presented
in the following section.
Theory of Knowledge-Constitutive Interests
Habermas theorises that there are three types of knowledge which are bound by
certain human interests. These three ‘knowledge-constitutive interests’ (KCI)
correspond to particular forms of sciences. The ‘empirical and analytic sciences’
promote the technical interest in predicting and controlling the natural world.
However, when individuals interact with each other this promotes an interest in
understanding and interpreting meanings, which gives rise to the ‘historical and
hermeneutics sciences.’ Finally, the third KCI derives from human beings’ concern
to achieve rational autonomy of action, free from any form of domination whether
the domination of nature over human life, or of some groups over others. This
concern for emancipation from domination is the interest served by the
‘emancipatory science’ of critical theory. Habermas’ theory of KCI is illustrated
in Table 1.
Habermas’ ‘emancipatory science’ or critical social science aims to realise
the individuals’ ability of self-reflection and critical thought. It does so by engaging
in his concept of ‘discourse.’ Here I intend to show how Habermas’ three KCI
give rise to three different views of education, each of which leads to a different
definition of curriculum. ‘Habermas’ knowledge-constitutive interests shape what
human beings consider as knowledge and determine the categories by which human
beings organise that knowledge’ (Grundy, 1987, p. 10). As illustrated in the table,
Habermas’ three basic interests, which are, the ‘technical’, ‘practical’ and
‘emancipatory’ or ‘critical’ interests constitute the three types of knowledge
generated and organised in society: the empirical-analytic, historical-hermeneutic,
and critical sciences.
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Grundy’s matching Habermas’ theory of KCI with Aristotle’s dispositions
of techne, phronesis, and praxis will be helpful in understanding different views
of curriculum. Aristotle views these dispositions as forms of reasoning that inform
different types of action. Grundy argues that these dispositions also correspond to
different forms of knowledge which then give rise to three different forms of
curriculum: ‘technical’, ‘practical’, and ‘critical.’ These three curricula differ in
terms of the forms of knowledge, aims of education, what education, schooling,
knowledge and curriculum mean, theory and practice relationship, teaching and
learning, the teacher’s role, the teacher-student relationship, and evaluation.
Curriculum as ‘Technical’
Aristotle identified the disposition of techne or skill with the action of the artisan
(craftsperson). An artisan engages in ‘making’ or ‘creating’ something where this
form of action depends upon the exercising of his/her skills (techne) and is based
on the idea or pattern that the artisan intends to make. Thus the artisan’s skilled
actions are restricted by the ‘idea’ of what is to be created. This ‘idea’ or image is
referred to as eidos by Grundy (1987); or, in the educational context, it can also be
considered the plan or programme consisting of some long term objectives.
Meanwhile, the outcome of the artisan’s skilled actions of making or creating is
known as the product. If this technical reasoning became the basis of education,
curriculum would then mean planned activities or experiences consisting of a certain
set of goals and objectives which teachers use their skills to produce. For example,
a student is considered ‘literate’ when s/he is able to produce a well written essay.
In this particular example, the essay is considered a material product or the evaluated
outcome where, based on this outcome, teachers can determine whether the student
is literate. In a sense, the lesson plan and the learning objectives can be considered
Table 1 Habermas’ Theory of Knowledge-Constitutive Interests
Type of Human Interest Kind of Knowledge Research Methods
Positivistic Sciences (empirical-
analytic methods)
Interpretive Research (historical
and hermeneutics methods)
Critical Social Sciences (critical
theory, emancipatory action
research)
Instrumental (causal
explanation)
Practical (understanding)
Emancipation (critical
reflection)
Technical (prediction)
Practical (interpretation
and understanding)
Emancipatory (criticism
and liberation)
(Source: Adapted from MacIsaac, 1996 and Carr, 1985, p. 94)
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the eidos that determine students’ learning. Education then becomes instrumental
and technical, while the teaching-learning process becomes instructional and
procedural because teachers ‘follow known rules, use given materials and means
to achieve the already determined ends’ (Carr, 1995, p. 11).
When importance is placed on the outcome or material product of education,
curriculum is seen as the means of achieving a product. But although curriculum
becomes a ‘product,’ it is not a productive view of the curriculum, rather it is a
reproductive view of the curriculum because curriculum as product suggests that
‘the purpose of a teacher’s work is to reproduce in the students the various ideas,
goals or objectives that guide the work’ (Grundy, 1987, p. 25). A reproductive
view of the curriculum involves the objectification of reality when it regards the
environment (including the learners) as an object, and ‘as objects their behaviour
and learning are managed by the teachers’ (ibid, p. 30). In another sense, besides
the manipulation of the environment, the ‘technical’ interest also implies that people
who formulate educational objectives are in power because it is the idea that
determines the end. Although teachers may be in control of the environment,
they do so because they are compelled to make sure that the desired learning
occurs. Hence teachers become mere implementers rather than important decision
makers.
The curriculum issues implied by this ‘technical’ curriculum include: What
are the specific objectives that the curriculum has been designed to achieve? What
kind of content can best achieve these objectives? How will these objectives be
evaluated? How would teachers manage their classes? What are the teaching skills
that teachers need to have in order to be effective in achieving these objectives?
And what exactly is the teacher’s role? As the reproductive curriculum is more
concerned with transmitting the traditions of a society so that established social
structures are maintained, this is made achievable through three essential
constituents: the ideas that are translated into specific objectives; the process
(teaching and learning process where teachers’ skills and effectiveness, and teaching
aids or given materials become useful); and the outcome or product (measured
against the fulfilment of the specified objectives). In this view of curriculum and
education, educational theory is divorced from its practice in the sense that there
exists a gap between the two. Apple (1990) labelled this view of education and
curriculum as a mechanical function of schooling because, when schooling strictly
becomes a site for social reproduction, it does not allow space for social
improvement and change.
Curriculum as ‘Practical’
The second view of education perceives curriculum as ‘practice’ and emerges from
Habermas’ second fundamental human interest, namely ‘practical’ interest. Drawing
upon Aristotle’s second disposition, that is, phronesis, translated as ‘practical
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judgment’, it is a disposition towards morally responsible or ‘good’ action rather
than ‘correct’ or instrumentally effective actions (Grundy, 1987). The tendency of
‘practical’ reasoning to do good, rather than correct actions distinguishes phronesis
from techne as the former deals with ‘doing’ actions while the latter with ‘making’
actions regardless of their values. Furthermore, the ‘practical’ interest involves
‘action between subjects, not action upon objects.’ To exercise practical judgment
one has to deliberate, which incorporates processes of interpretation, meaning-
making, and reflection of a situation so that appropriate action can be decided
upon and taken. When a ‘practical’ interest is informing curriculum practices, the
emphasis is placed on practice rather than the outcome or product.
A curriculum based on the ‘practical’ interest would not be a syllabus to be
implemented but be a proposal that could influence teachers’ judgments of what
action they ought (morally) to take in particular educational situations. More
importantly, it is an act of meaning-making in the sense that it involves teachers’
interpretations of curriculum policies and proposals. In doing so, teachers create
their own meanings as they make moral judgments about what they ought to do
when dealing with their students as learning subjects rather than objects. Meaning-
making also becomes a form of learning for the students and teachers as they
interact with each other in their attempt to understand. Learning and not teaching
becomes the central focus of teachers because the ‘idea’ takes a different position
in curriculum as practice. In this ‘practical’ view of education, the product no
longer becomes the focus of education as students are not objectified. The ‘idea’
becomes more general and implied in the ‘notion of the ‘good’ that depends upon
teachers’ judgment as to how the idea is interpreted and translated into action.’
(Grundy, 1987, p. 74) In this ‘practical’ view of curriculum, teachers are not mere
implementers of a planned programme but act as decision makers themselves when
they exercise their own practical judgment in their students’ learning. In this view
of curriculum as practice, curriculum is perceived as an ‘idea’ that is determined
by the considerations of the ‘good.’ The relationship of theory and practice is
dialectical as both inform each other and are guided by values and criteria that
concern the ‘good’ rather than the ‘correct.’ The product or outcome is not the
focus in this particular view but the ‘good’ action or practice is.
Similarly, pedagogy, would involve making judgments that would further
the ‘good’ of all participants. Stenhouse advocates that curriculum itself is ‘a
particular form of specification about the practice of teaching and not as a package
of materials or a syllabus of ground to be covered.’ (Grundy, 1987, p. 71). If this is
the case for curriculum as practice then each school would be responsible and
accountable for the development and evaluation of their own educational policies
and practices. There would be neither a centralised curriculum nor a centralised
examination system because the power resides with the schools and not the
policymakers. In fact, the teachers’ role would also involve all aspects of curriculum
development. When a ‘practical’ interest influences curriculum practices, they may
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be facilitated by the teachers’ pedagogical skills, but they depend more on the
teachers exercising their judgement. Thus it is essential to understand the distinction
between judgment and skill. Judgment is not a skill because it is not developed
through technical training but through processes of reflection. So two teachers
may teach the same subject and they may face a similar practical problem but how
they proceed to solve the problem would be different because each would depend
on their practical judgment and not their technical skills in overcoming the problem.
This is the value of the ‘practical’ interest and curriculum as practice which is
absent in the ‘technical’ interest and curriculum as product.
Curriculum as ‘Critical’
Habermas’ third interest, which is the emancipatory interest, when matched with
Aristotle’s disposition of praxis (morally informed and committed action) gives
rise to the view of curriculum as praxis. This interest is also compatible with the
‘practical’ interest and, according to Grundy (1987), the emancipatory interest is
the development of the ‘practical’ interest although is neither a necessary nor a
natural development. Curriculum as praxis accepts the claim that knowledge is
socially constructed and therefore not only involves critical interpretation, reflection
and practical judgment, but also actively involves the construction and
reconstruction of meanings. Praxis is a dynamic interaction of action and reflection
and its relationship to the emancipatory interest is made clear in its emphasis on
questioning the interest that is being served by certain kinds of knowledge. It is by
critically questioning the social and ideological purpose of knowledge that praxis
enlightens what is problematic within that socially constructed knowledge. By
doing so, curriculum as praxis makes participants aware of the origins of
that knowledge, and enlightens them as to how that knowledge has become
embedded in the dominant ideology and thereby functions to suppress participants’
right to construct and reconstruct their own meanings. The relationship between
theory and practice in this view of curriculum and education is dialectical
and dynamic where theory and practice transform each other through critical
reflection.
The guiding ‘idea’ of the emancipatory interest is neither as specific as the
‘technical’ interest nor as general as the idea of ‘good’ of the ‘practical’ interest.
The ‘idea’ of the emancipatory interest falls in between both ideas, which is the
‘idea’ of ‘emancipation’ as a specific educational good (Grundy, 1987). Curriculum
praxis that is informed by an emancipatory interest will constantly ask the question
of whether curriculum practice emancipates participants from the dictates of
ideology through the process of learning. The selection of curriculum content is
based on a ‘negotiated’ curriculum that promotes critical consciousness. Negotiation
of the curriculum means that teacher and student together negotiate its content.
The selection of curriculum content goes through critical investigation as what is
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being counted as curriculum knowledge itself becomes a legitimate part of
curriculum content. The content of curriculum as praxis allows students to be
involved in the knowledge construction process. Knowledge is not learned in the
cognitive sense alone, but it also involves the beliefs of the participants to the
extent that it is students who will determine whether to change or refuse to change.
In this sense there is no coercion in learning and teachers do not have any control
of the students, which explicitly contradicts the curriculum based on the ‘technical’
interest.
Just like curriculum content, pedagogy is also perceived differently by
curriculum as praxis. Pedagogy that is informed by an emancipatory interest
becomes part of the rigorous meaning-making activity of a group of participants
who are able to participate in a critical discourse through undistorted
communication, where truth is established through consensual agreement. More
importantly, ‘the teacher-student’ contradiction prevalent in the ‘technical’
curriculum is resolved. Teachers do not only teach but are also taught through
dialogue with their students. Similarly, students not only learn but also teach
themselves as they have equal opportunities to be involved in making meanings.
The following table shows the different forms of knowledge and the views that
each sustains.
Aims of
education
Education
Schooling
Knowledge
To produce
individuals who are
rational and skilful
to fulfil established
roles in society.
Instrument of social
reproduction.
A site for transmitting
an established body
of knowledge.
Objective and
corresponding to
facts, guided by
‘technical’ interests.
For example,
An understanding to
develop individuals
who are able to make
meanings and practical
judgments according to
the ‘good’ rather than
the ‘correct.’
Instrument of social
reconstruction.
A site for making
meanings and practical
judgments.
Subjective and
interpretive according
to individuals’
experiences, guided by
‘practical’ interests.
To develop individuals
to become critical and
active meaning-makers,
able to transform society,
and establish social
justice.
Instrument of social
transformation.
A site for the discourse
of cultural politics.
Knowledge is consensual
and based on reflection
and self-interpretations;
guided by
‘emancipatory’ or
Table 2 Three Forms of Knowledge and Their Views of Education
Curriculum as ‘Technical’ ‘Practical’ ‘Critical’
cont.
80 Teachers’ Learning, Curriculum Innovations and Knowledge Applications
Curriculum
Theory and
Practice
Relationship
Pedagogy
Role of
Teacher
Freire’s concept of
‘banking education’
indicates how
knowledge is
regarded as a
commodity.
Structured syllabus,
subject specialisa-
tion, instructional
application of theory.
Transmission of
knowledge and
skills.
Linear between
theory and practice
where theory
influences practice.
Instructional and
directive pedagogy:
Teachers transmit
knowledge and
students are mere
recipients.
Authoritative and
mere implementer.
‘Practical’ activity of
the process of interac-
tion between teachers
and students.
Interdependent; theory
influences practice and
practice influences
theory where both are
guided in shared
understanding.
Deliberation and
negotiation of the
meaning of text
between teachers and
students. Students
become active construc-
tor of meaning and
knowledge.
Facilitating students to
make their own mean-
ings and construct their
own learning experi-
ences. Developer and
initiator of curriculum
change.
Freire’s ‘critical’
interests in his
‘conscientization.’
Praxis; all human
activity is understood as
emerging from ongoing
interaction of reflection,
dialogue, and action
through critical pedagogy
(Darder et al., 2003,
p.15).
Dialectical relationship:
theory transforms
practice and practice
transforms theory.
Through dialogue or
discourse students
become teachers and
teachers become students
as they reflect and
participate in critical
pedagogy.
Project organiser,
moderator or coordinator
with an emancipatory
aim. Participatory
decision maker with
students, administrator,
and even community.
Table 2 continued
Curriculum as ‘Technical’ ‘Practical’ ‘Critical’
cont.
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The following section analyses Islamic education and identifies the type of
curriculum that frames its view of education.
Islamic Education in the Malaysian Curriculum
Islamic Education and the ‘Technical’ Curriculum
Islamic education in the Malaysian curriculum can be understood in two ways.
The first is when Islamic education means ‘taught subjects’ in the national schools
and the second is when Islamic education means the ‘curriculum’ of the Islamic
religious schools. It can be argued that Islamic education in the Malaysian
curriculum, whether treated as a subject or as curriculum, is still based on a
‘technical’ view of education. When Islamic education is taught as a subject in the
national school curriculum, Islamic education then merely becomes content that
needs to be transmitted to the Muslim students. Meanwhile, when Islamic education
refers to the curriculum of Islamic religious schools, the term ‘curriculum’ in this
context connotes curriculum as ‘product.’ Although the curriculum of Islamic
education is religious, it is situated in the Malaysian education system, which
Teacher-
Student
Relationship
Evaluation
Teacher is in
authority, directive,
and controls
students’ progress.
To assess how close
the product matches
the ‘idea’ or techne
in the form of ‘tests’
of acquisition of
what is known and
skills mastered.
Teacher is a
participant just like
students in meaning
making and
encourages morally
informed actions.
To judge whether the
learning processes
and practices are able
to further the ‘good’
of all participants.
Dialogical relationship
which dissolves the
contradiction of teacher-
student; teacher teaches
yet becomes a student
him/herself when s/he is
taught by his/her students.
Evaluation itself becomes
part of the rigorous
meaning-making activity
where guided by the
‘emancipatory’ interest,
participants themselves
evaluate the extent of
enlightenment and
emancipation that they
experienced in the
learning process.
Table 2 continued
Curriculum as ‘Technical’ ‘Practical’ ‘Critical’
(Source: Derived from Kemmis et al., 1983; Freire 1978; Grundy, 1987; and Darder et al., 2003)
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inevitably directs it towards becoming a ‘technical’ curriculum. Moreover, Muslim
scholars who were responsible for developing the curriculum of Islamic religious
schools, have moved from being ‘traditional’ (in the sense of being outdated, too
theoretical, and unable to prepare Muslims for the challenges of a modern and
post-modern eras) to becoming ‘traditional’ in the positivistic sense (Husain and
Ashraf, 1979; Al Faruqi, 1982; Hashim, 1996: 1999; Kazmi, 2003; Sardar, 2003).
This change has led to the development of a ‘technical’ Islamic curriculum (Hashim,
1999). Muslim scholars aspired to rejuvenate Islamic education by subscribing to
the methodology of Western modernity and scientific rationality. However, this
attempt ignored the philosophical assumptions underlying the effect of scientific
rationality on society, hence objectifying and technologising Islamic education
with the aim of making it more practical in the modern world yet retaining the
characteristics of ‘revealed’ knowledge that is ‘objective’, ‘certain’ and
‘indubitable.’
The problem with an objective and ‘technical’ Islamic curriculum lies in the
contradiction that is inherent in the Islamic curriculum regarding the ‘means’ and
the ‘end’ of Islamic education. The ‘end’ for which Islamic education is undertaken
can neither be specified in advance as an outcome, nor can it be specified by
instrumental means. The reason is the ‘end’ can only be realised through the
‘means.’ The point is to teach the process and not the product because if the end of
Islamic education is to develop ‘good’ Muslims who will establish social justice,
adopting a ‘technical’ view of the Islamic curriculum implies that the ‘end’ product
would be Muslims who focus on the economic, political, and social demands of a
modern and technological world. This is because the aim of a ‘technical’ curriculum
is defined and dictated by economic and political forces. When this is the case, it is
not a surprise that the initial aim of Islamic education to develop ‘good’ Muslims
is easily undermined. An Islamic curriculum that is ‘technical’ can only produce a
‘product’ that is measurable, but ‘good’ Muslims can never be measured because
the Islamic education understanding of ‘good’ involves action and judgments that
are made based on this faith. So how are Muslims’ actions and judgments
empirically measured to ensure that they are made based on their faith? The inability
of the ‘technical’ Islamic curriculum in fulfilling the aim of Islamic education
shows the weakness of this kind of curriculum.
What is more alarming about this weakness is that it has the ability to mask
its weakness by distorting reality. The ‘technical’ curriculum advances objective
and scientific knowledge as the only knowledge that is considered as rational and
thus worth learning. Its denial of other forms of reasoning and knowledge signifies
its hegemonic tendency, which promotes its ideology through the nexus of the
power-knowledge relationship. This ideological domination distorts reality by
presenting the social world like the natural world as ‘given’ rather than socially,
politically, and culturally constructed. It is this dominant ideology that perpetuates
the advancement and pervasion of science and technology and projects a distorted
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reality of the social world of human beings, which undermines the purpose of
Islamic education in upholding morality and spirituality.
Islamic Education as ‘Personalised’ Knowledge
The preceding discussion on Islamic education and its curriculum based on the
‘technical’ view of education explains the failure of Islamic education in fulfilling
its noble aim. At this juncture it is important that an alternative view of Islamic
education and its curriculum is suggested. Another understanding of the kinds of
knowledge that could be used to explain what Islamic education is all about and
how its aim could be achieved is presented in Kazmi’s division of two kinds of
knowledge: ‘theoretical’ and ‘personalised’ knowledge. It can be argued that
Kazmi’s idea of ‘personalised’ knowledge is constitutive of the ‘practical’ and
‘critical’ knowledge propounded by Habermas. But what exactly is this
‘personalised’ knowledge and why is it considered important in the advancement
of Islamic knowledge and education?
Kazmi (1999) categorised knowledge into two: theoretical and ‘personalised’.
Theoretical knowledge is associated with the ‘abstract, formal, universal, and deals
with experiences that are repeatable’ (Kazmi, 1999, p. 213). Theoretical knowledge
may be distinct from ‘personalised’ knowledge but they actually complement each
other. ‘Personalised’ knowledge deals with ‘non-repeatable and specific experiences
that are peculiar to a human being or humans in a given situation’ (ibid). Theoretical
and ‘personalised’ knowledge are dependent on each other and one is meaningless
without the other. For instance, one can read about the game of chess in a book but
to really understand the game of chess, one needs to at least watch how it is being
played, if not play it him/herself. Understanding the game of chess involves making
judgments about the game and it is the example of game that shows how
‘understanding is a function of making judgments’ (Kazmi, 1999, p. 216). The
personal encounter with the game of chess enables one to have ‘personalised’
knowledge of the game of chess. So ‘personalised’ knowledge is learnt not from
the transmission of facts or information from one to another rather it is learnt by
encountering, understanding, and making judgments about a certain thing. For
example, parents do not teach their children through theoretical discourse but
through their spoken words, actions, way of thinking, and living that leave a
profound mark on their children’s lives. In this sense ‘personalised’ knowledge is
constitutive of Habermas’ ‘practical knowledge.’
A child may be taught that it is a virtue to speak the truth but she/he may not
be able to grasp an understanding of the value of being honest if she/he does not
learn why it is important to speak the truth. The theoretical knowledge that she/he
has of honesty becomes meaningful when she/he has a personal encounter with it,
through observing people when they speak the truth or lie, listening, understanding,
reflecting, and practising it. She/he can be considered as being able to grasp the
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meaning of being honest when she/he realises its importance by practising it himself/
herself. Kazmi contends that the primary role of a teacher is not so much to create
theoretical knowledge, but rather to ‘personalise’ knowledge. Before a teacher
creates ‘personalised’ knowledge, she/he needs to have the ability to interpret,
understand, and judge his or her own experiences so that she/he would know what
is she/he is trying to personalise is true. ‘For a teacher the only way to understand
knowledge is to live it and experience the difference that knowledge makes to his/
her life as a Muslim’ (Kazmi, 1999, p. 218). What a teacher teaches is not an
impersonal theoretical body of knowledge that she/he has accepted as truth by
verifying it against some objective principles but rather ‘teaches knowledge that
she/he has lived and having lived found it to be true or false’ (ibid). It is in the life
of a teacher that the distinction between theory and practice, and knowing and
acting disappears. The relationship between theory and practice is no longer linear
like in technical knowledge but becomes dialectical where theory informs practice
and practice informs theory. This is the main point of my argument where Kazmi’s
idea of ‘personalised’ knowledge coincides with Habermas’ ‘practical’ and ‘critical’
knowledge.
The teacher’s act of knowing and acting corresponds to Habermas’ ‘practical’
knowledge but it is the teacher’s continuous effort of personalisation of knowledge
that points to Habermas’ ‘critical’ knowledge. Kazmi explained that ‘a body of
knowledge does not only allow one ‘personalised’ knowledge’ (1999, p. 219).
Personalisation of knowledge is based on the interpretation of experiences where
different kinds of experiences determine the form of ‘personalised’ knowledge. A
truth can be ‘personalised’ in a variety of ways where each personalisation is valid
as long as it does not violate the truth. This entails that there is a need for continuous
personalisation of knowledge as it may differ in terms of time and places, which
prevents its truth from becoming jaded. It is this understanding of ‘personalised’
knowledge that points to the conditions of a teacher: to be critical, and pursue
critical knowledge. In order for Muslims to understand what Islamic education is,
and how to be a good Muslim, a teacher needs to be able to demonstrate the ability
to understand, think critically, reflect, and make good judgments (phronesis). It is
through such pedagogy, based on the ‘practical’ and ‘critical’ curriculum (see
Table 2), that would enable Muslim learners to learn and understand Islamic
education and consequently practise Islam as a way of life. This is because, if
Islamic education is serious in realising its aims, then ‘practical’ and ‘critical
knowledge,’ which are inherent in ‘personalised’ knowledge, could offer an
alternative view of education that may assist in realising the aims, ideals, and
values of Islamic education.
Islamic education should not be taught as a subject or based on a ‘technical’
curriculum, but rather as a way of living through a ‘practical’ and ‘critical’
curriculum. The current trend of teaching Islamic education and the nature of its
curriculum in the Islamic education system cannot accommodate the teaching of
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‘personalised’ knowledge because of the incommensurability of the ‘technical’
Islamic curriculum and the curriculum of ‘personalised’ knowledge. This has
eventually led to the inability of the current view of curriculum and pedagogy in
Islamic education in Malaysia to achieve the aim, ideals, and values of Islamic
education. It is on the basis of this argument that the discussion on what type of a
teacher that is necessary to teach Islamic education in a way that would realise the
aims, ideals, and values of Islamic education is introduced at this stage.
Murabbi: An Islamic Critical Pedagogue/Teacher
It is important to understand the concept of murabbi at this point since this discussion
will also explain the kind of knowledge and pedagogy that can help in achieving
the ideals and values of Islamic education. In order for a Muslim to be able to read
and understand the Quran and practise its teachings in his/her daily life, it is
important that she/he learns to relate the signs in the world (his/her own world
experiences) and the signs (verses) in the Qur’an. But to learn to read the signs
this way is equal to learning to make judgments and making such judgments cannot
be learned as a Muslim learns about theoretical knowledge. Learning to make
judgments is like learning personalised knowledge by personalising it or doing
it himself/herself. It should be noted that Kazmi’s concept of personalised
knowledge differs from Polanyi’s (1962) concept of personal knowledge. Polanyi’s
concept of personal knowledge is a non-thematic knowledge that one acquires
without any conscious effort or even awareness of learning it. One is in fact,
socialised into it.
Kazmi (1999) claims that education is about helping students create a
configuration or specific structure of meaning that tells them what is important
and what is not. The acquisition of a configuration of meaning is the result of a
complex process of listening, watching, reflecting, and practice. For instance, a
child learns from his/her parents what matters and what does not by watching and
listening to his/her parents, and reflecting and practising what she/he learns on a
daily basis. ‘A murabbi does what parents do but more explicitly and on a higher
level of sophistication’ (Kazmi, 1999, pp. 217-8). A murabbi is the one who is
able to teach personalised knowledge because a murabbi is not a facilitator, and
does not merely teach what she/he knows or think others should know, but rather
she/he teaches it because she/he has lived the experience and found it to be true or
false (Kazmi, 1999). An example of a murabbi is seen in the Prophet Muhammad
peace be upon him because he has reached that level where he is able to reflect the goodness
of his life in his every action, word, and idea. This is because although he was a
Prophet he was ‘neither an ascetic recluse nor an intellectual tower’; although he
was an illiterate he was a thinker, and; although ‘he was a thinker he was not a
cerebral cogitator like our present intellectuals are’ (Kazmi, 2002, p. 196). In this
sense, Prophet Muhammad peace be upon him was a fully ‘embodied thinker because his
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activity and experience of thinking is neither purely mental nor purely physical,
but it was an activity in which their whole being participated’ (Kazmi, 2002, p.
196).
Every act that a Muslim does should be done with his/her whole being. For
instance, the obligatory prayers that Muslims have to perform five times a day are
not done by ‘his/her body and soul and heart and mind, but as an embodied
person, surrendering in the single act of prostration his/her whole being to God’
(Kazmi, 2002, p. 197). It is important to understand that the term ‘thinking’ to
which is being in ‘embodied thinking’ is not the common thinking that is usually
understood as a cognitive activity, but rather ‘it refers to reflection as a mode of
being in which human faculties do not function separately but in unison, in harmony
with each other’ (ibid, p. 213). Yet it is also important to know that the prophetic
thinking is the highest level of embodied thinking, but this does not mean that
embodied thinking is impossible to achieve. This is because, history has revealed
that this is possible when Prophet Muhammad’s peace be upon him Companions were
also regarded as good models of embodied thinkers to be followed after the
demise of the Prophet peace be upon him for their sound and good judgment. Thus, the
emphasis that a murabbi needs to make in his/her everyday teaching is not just to
impart the knowledge of Islam, but more importantly to show how to become a
good Muslim.
CONCLUSION
This chapter explores the question of the Islamic education curriculum and its
view of education and how to a certain extent has failed to realise the true purpose
of Islamic education. The main problem with the contemporary Islamic education
system is that it is based on the ‘technical’ curriculum and view of education. This
particular ‘means-end’ view of education only promotes knowledge as a ‘product,’
rather than ‘personalised’ knowledge, which is how knowledge should be viewed
in Islamic education. This particular view of curriculum and education does not
provide the conditions for the development of the kind of teachers essential in
helping to achieve the ideals and values of Islamic education. Murabbis are the
only teachers that can teach ‘personalised’ knowledge, hence there is a need for an
alternative view of curriculum and education that would develop, support, and
provide the space for murabbis.
It is also argued that this could be achieved in a critical view of curriculum
and pedagogy. If Islamic education is based on a critical view of curriculum and
education where the kind of knowledge that is taught takes the form of ‘personalised’
knowledge and the teachers emulate the pedagogy of murabbis, then it is possible
to achieve the purpose of Islamic education.
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